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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
KENNETH SHARP, GEORGE 
CHRISTENSEN, and JAMES N. 
TUCKER, 
Defendant-Appellants. 
Case Nos. 16147, 16040, 
and 16019 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
KENNETH SHARP, GEORGE CHRISTENSEN, and JAMES N. TUCKER, 
were convicted as charged of the offense of Aiding Escape, 
and Theft of an Operable Motor Vehicle, in the District Court 
of the Third Judicial District, in and for the County of 
Salt Lake, State of Utah, the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, 
Judge presiding. 
This brief is intended to apply to Appellants KENNETH 
SHARP, GEORGE CHRISTENSEN, and JAMES N. TUCKER, and treats 
the conviction of the crime of Theft of an Operable Motor 
Vehicle, pursuant to §76-6-404, Utah Code Annotated (1953 
as amended) . 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellants were sentenced to prison for the term as 
provided by law for both charges, which sentences were to 
run concurrently, after a jury found them guilty of the 
offenses of Escape, Appellant TUCKER; Aiding Escape, 
Appellants SHARP and CHRISTENSEN; and Theft of an Operable 
Motor Vehicle, all Appellants. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the judgment rendered on 
both counts, or in the alternative, a new trial. 
STATEME!H OF THE FACTS 
At the trial in the above entitled matter, Glenn 
Hudson, a Records Identification Officer at the Utah State 
Prison, testified regarding the status of the three appellants 
in the above entitled action on the date of April 19, 1979. 
After laying a foundation regarding the records that he had 
in his possession, State's Exhibit 2-S was admitted which 
showed that the appellant JAMES N. TUCKER had been committed 
to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term as 
provided by law for a crime of Rape, of not less than one nor 
more than fifteen years. Also admitted were records 
purporting to be an order for a 90-day evaluation for the 
appellant KENNETH SHARP (State's Exhibit 5-S), and a similar 
-2-
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order for the appellant GEORGE CHRISTENSEN (State's Exhibit 
6-S). 
On the face of the above documents it appeared that 
the appellant JAMES N. TUCKER was incarcerated at the Utah 
State Prison pursuant to a valid commitment while the 
appellants SHARP and CHRISTENSEN were in the Utah State 
Prison only for the purposes of testing and evaluation. 
Paul Christensen testified that on the 18th day of 
April, 1978, he was employed at the Utah State Prison and 
that he knew all three of the appellants. (R. 205) 
Mr. Christensen testified that on the day in question he 
had taken the three appellants out to work in an area of the 
farm on the Utah State Prison grounds. Some hour and a 
half later, he returned to discover two shovels together 
in one portion of the ditch, and a third shovel at the 
other end of the field. (R. 220) 
Mr. Christensen then reported the three appellants 
missing. He further testified that some time later he was 
called to an area in Butterfield Canyon where he made an 
identification of two of the appellants, SHARP and 
CHRISTENSEN. 
Eleanor Collard testified for the State that on the 
19th day of April, 1978, she was employed and on duty for 
Riverton City. She further testified that around 3:00 in 
the afternoon she had an occassion to see three young men 
walking down the street side by side. (R. 231) Darlene 
Ruark testified for the State that on April 19th, 1978 she 
-3-
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was working at Save More Television at approximately 
12600 South on Redwood Road. (R. 238) She further 
testified that on that day at approximately 2:45 she 
observed three males in front of the windows in the store. 
(R. 240) Marsha Ruark testified that on April 19th, 1978, 
she was also at Save More Television and that she arrived 
there between 1:00 and 1:30 in the afternoon in a 
white 1971 Cadillac. Some time between 2:30 and 3:00 
she observed a person walk briefly into the store and 
shortly thereafter, she heard an engine start. She ran 
to the front door and looked out to observe her car 
being driven away. (R. 249) Marsha Ruark further testified 
that she gave no one permission to take her car from 
the place where it was parked on the day in question. Mrs. 
Ruark reported the theft of her automobile to the police 
authorities and Leonard Smock and Officer Whipple, among 
others, left in pursuit of the vehicle. Officer Whipple 
spotted the vehicle and several officers joined in a 
chase. The Cadillac proceeded at a high rate of speed, 
running cars off the road and running a stop sign in at least 
one location. (R. 289) Several police cars pursued the 
vehicle, eventually following into an area of Butterfield 
Canyon. (R. 291) The total distance of the chase was 
approximately five miles. (R. 299) The appellant, JAMES 
N. TUCKER, was observed by the officers to be driving the 
vehicle. 
-4-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
At the conclusion of the chase, the appellants SHARP 
and CHRISTENSEN, passengers in the vehicle, abandoned the 
vehicle, fled in one direction and were captured shortly 
thereafter. The driver, TUCKER, fled in another direction 
and was subsequently apprehended in the neighboring 
vicinity by a citizen in the area. Harsha and Darlene 
Ruark testified that when they had recovered the vehicle 
later, the license plates had not been removed or altered, 
and that the vehicle did not appear to be damaged, except 
for being covered with dirt and smeared with the "dust" 
that was used to test for fingerprints on the vehicle. 
(R. 243, 253). 
Appellant TUCKER testified under oath that on the 
19th day of April, 1978, he was in the Utah State Prison 
on a commitment. He also testified that on April 19th he 
was put on a work detail and he left on his own and without 
any aid from the appellants SHARP and CHRISTENSEN. (R. 233) 
Appellant TUCKER further testified that some time later 
he ran into the other two appellants in Riverton. He said 
that he had been drinking during the course of the morning 
while at the prison, and that in Riverton he began to sober 
up to the point where he resolved to go back to the prison. 
He and appellant SHARP started to hitchhike back towards 
the prison, when appellant CHRISTENSEN drove up in a 1971 
Cadillac. Appellant TUCKER testified that they then 
resolved to drive around a little bit before going back to 
-5-
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the prison and turn themselves in. (R. 237) 
Appellant TUCKER further states that when he saw the 
police he panicked and fled in the vehicle. He ended up 
driving to the Butterfield Canyon area where he was 
subsequently apprehended. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
TO GIVE TO THE JURY THE REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION RELATING TO THE LESSER 
INCLUDED OFFENSE OF DEPRIVING THE 
OWNER. 
The appellants throughout the course of the trial 
attempted to introduce evidence relating to the intention 
of the defendant relative to the taking of the car. The 
owner of the car, Darlene Ruark, testified on cross 
examination that there was no damage done to the car 
other than that it was dirty and dusty, and had been 
fingerprinted by the police. (R. 243) On cross examination, 
counsel for one of the appellants elicited from the 
daughter of the owner of the vehicle testimony that the 
vehicle was in no way damaged, that the license plate 
hadn't been altered, that the vehicle hadn't been repainted, 
and that there was no other alteration of the vehicle in 
any way. (R. 253-254) Leonard Smock, Chief of Police of 
Riverton, Utah, testified that the vehicle was driven only 
about five miles from its location in Riverton, (R. 299), 
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and that he and other police officers were in pursuit 
of that vehicle throughout almost all of that distance. 
Police Chief Smock testified that when he reached the 
vehicle that it's condition did not appear to have been 
altered in any way. (R. 300) 
Counsel for the Appellant TUCKER, after having laid 
a foundation regarding the police chief's expertise as a 
police officer, and as having established his background 
in previous escape searches, put to the witness the question 
"Chief, in your experience as a police officer, are you aware 
that individuals, and individuals that might escape, 
would generally not keep a vehicle that they take, true?", 
at which point (R. 300), to this question, the prosecution 
interposed an objection which objection was sustained. 
(R. 301) After laying further foundation, counsel put 
the question to the police chief again. Counsel for the 
respondent once again raised an objection which objection 
was once again sustained. (R. 301) 
The Appellant TUCKER testified in his own behalf and 
in behalf of the co-defendants that none of them intended 
to permanently deprive the owner of the car and that they 
only intended to use the car to get back to the prison 
itself. (R. 346) 
-7-
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In Appellant TUCKER's proposed instructions Numbers 
2 and 3*, Appellant properly requested the trial court 
to instruct the jury on the offense of Depriving an Owner 
Temporarily of his Vehicle, a violation of §41-l-109, 
Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). (R. 55) This 
instruction was denied as an alternative theory to Count I 
of the Information by the trial court. (R. 56) Counsel 
for all Appellants also moved to dismiss the charge of 
Auto Theft, a Second Degree Felony, at the end of the 
State's case on the theory that at most, the State had 
proved the misdemeanor offense of Depriving an Owner. 
(R. 329-326) Counsel for Appellants also moved for a 
Directed verdict of not guilty as to Count I, Theft of an 
Operable Motor Vehicle, at the end of all of the evidence. 
(R. 404-405) This motion was also denied by the trial 
court. (R. 406) 
Depriving an owner is a necessarily included offense 
of Theft of an Operable Motor Vehicle; consequently, the 
court's failure to instruct the jury on Depriving an Owner 
* These same instructions were submitted by Appellants 
CHRISTENSEN (R. 70-71) and SHARP (R- 86-87). Counsel for 
appellants requested both Instructions 2 and 3 in writing 
and took exception to the trial court's failure to give such 
requests to the jury, properly preserving this issue on 
appeal. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule Sl. State v. 
Erickson, Utah, 568 P.2d 750 (1971); State v. Bell, 563 P.2d 
186 (1977); and State v. Gleason, 17 U.2d 150, 405 P.2d 
793 (1965). Accord: Rules of Practice in the District 
Courts, Rule 5.4. 
-8-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
constituted prejudicial error and the appellants' conviction 
for Theft on an Operable Motor Vehicle should be reversed 
and a new trial granted. 
The appellants requested that the trial court instruct 
the jury on Depriving an Owner as a lesser included 
offense. (R. 55) 
A. THE DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL CASE 
HAS A RIGHT TO SUBMIT HIS THEORY OF 
THE CASE TO THE JURY IN THE INSTRUCTIONS. 
It has long been the law in the State of Utah, that 
an accused in a criminal action has a right to submit to 
the jury his theory of the case, and that such theory, 
when properly requested, should be given to the jury in 
the form of written instructions. State v. Stenbeck, 
78 U.350, P.2d 1050 (1931). In Utah, this right allows 
for the presentation of instructions on all defenses 
and theories, including lesser included offenses, when such 
are properly requested by the accused. State v. Gillian, 
23 U.2d 372, 374, 463 P.2d 811 (1970); State v. Mitcheson, 
Utah, 560 P.2d 1120 (1977). 
An accused may make the decision as a matter of 
trial strategy to go "for broke" and decline to request 
instructions on lesser included offense if his theory of 
defense so dictates. State v. Mora, Utah, 558 P.2d 1335, 
1137 (1977); State v. Gellaty, 22 U.2d 149, 152, 449 P.2d 
993 (1969); State v. Valdez, 79 U.2d 426, 428, 432 P.2d 
-9-
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53 (1967); State v. Mitchell, 3 U.2d 70, 278 P.2d 618 
(1955). However, when the accused as his theory of the 
case requests instructions on lesser included offenses 
and is willing to submit his guilt or innocence to the 
jury on that theory, the trial court as a general rule 
is duty bound to submit these alternatives to the trier 
of the fact. State v. Gillian, 23 U.2d 374, 375, 463 P.2d 
811 (1970). 
When the theory of defense embraces an argument, in 
effect in mitigation, that he is guilty of not the crime 
as charged in the Information, but some lesser offense, 
the teachings of Gillian yet apply. On this point, 
the Gillian court stated: 
One of the fundamental principles 
to the submission of issues to 
juries is that where the parties 
so request they are entitled to 
have instruction given on their 
theory of the case; and this 
includes on lesser offenses if 
any reasonable view of the evidence 
would support such a verdict. 
(State v. Gillian, supra, 
23U.2d at 374). 
In Gillian, this court pained out the reasons for 
this rule and the instant case illustrates the soundness 
of such a rule. This court said it should not be the 
prerogative of the trial court to direct the jury as to 
what degree of crime they may find a defendant guilty or 
to direct them that they must find him not guilty if they 
do not find him guilty of the greater offense. To allow 
-10-
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this permits the court to be a judge of the facts and to, 
in effect, direct a verdict on the lesser included offenses. 
Such a procedure violates the historical spirit as well 
as letter of our system on jury trial under the Sixth 
and Fourteenth Amendmens to the United States Constitution 
and Article I, Sections 10 and 12 of the Constitution of 
Utah. State v. Ferguson, 74 Utah 263, 279 P.2d (1929) 
(Straup, J. concurring). See also United States v. 
Skinner, 437 F.2d 164, 165 (5th Cir., 1971). 
B. DEPRIVING AN OWNER IS A LESSER 
INCLUDED OFFENSE OF THEFT OF AN 
OPERABLE MOTOR VEHICLE. 
The test most recently given to determine if one 
offense is a lesser included offense of another is that 
found in the recently revised Utah Criminal Code. 
Utah Code Annotated §76-1-402(3) (1953 as amended), provides 
in pertinent part: 
A defendant may be convicted of 
an offense included in the offense 
charged, but may not be convicted 
of both the offense charged and the 
included offense. An offense is so 
included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of 
the same or less than all the facts 
required to establish the commission 
of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, 
solicitaion, conspiracy, or form of 
preparation to commit the offense 
charged or an offense otherwise 
included therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated 
by a statute as a lesser included 
offense. 
-11-
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This statute was recently interpreted in State v. 
Lloyd, Utah, 568 P.2d 357 (1977) and its companion case, 
State v. Cornish, Utah, 568 P.2d (1977) wherein this court 
held that the Utah Depriving an Owner statute is a lesser 
included offense of Theft of an Operable Motor Vehicle. 
The process by which such a determination is made 
was described in State v. Woolman, 84 Utah 23, 33 P.2d 
640 (1934): 
The only way this matter may be 
determined is by discovering 
all of the elements required by 
the respective sections, comparing 
them and by a process of inclusion 
and exclusion, determine those 
common and those not common, and, 
if the greater offense includes 
all legal and factual elements, 
it may safely be said that the 
greater includes the lesser, if, 
however, the lesser offense requires 
the inclusion of some necessary 
element or elements in order to 
cover the completed offense, not 
so included in the greater offense, 
then it may be safely said that 
the lesser is not necessarily 
included in the greater. (33 P.2d 
at 645) 
C. WHEN MUST THE TRIAL COURT INSTRUCT 
THE JURY ON LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES. 
When one concedes that Depriving an Owner is a lesser 
included offense of Theft of an Operable Motor Vehicle under 
Utah's statutes, the issue then becomes when must the trial 
court instruct the jury on such a lesser included offense. 
-12-
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The need that such an instruction be given has been 
ruled to be a statutory requirement and is found in Utah 
Code Annotated §77-33-6 (1953 as amended), which states: 
The jury may find the defendant 
guilty of any offense the commission 
of which is necessarily included 
in that which he is charged in 
the indictment or information, 
or of an attempt to commit the 
offense. 
This provision was expounded upon by the legislature 
in the 1973 Criminal Code Revision in §76-1-402(4), which 
provides: 
The court shall not be 
obligated to charge the jury 
with respect to an included 
offense unless there is a 
rational basis for a verdict 
acquitting the defendant 
of the offense charged and 
convicting him of the included 
offense. [Emphasis Supplied] 
The foregoing provision, as this court has noted, 
codifies prior existing common law principles dating back 
to territorial times in Utah. People v. Robinson, 6 U.lOl, 
21 P.403 (1889); State v. Bender, Utah, 581 P.2d 1019 (1978). 
In State v. Barkas, 91 Utah 574, 65 P.2d 1130 (1937), 
this court noted that the failure to give an instruction 
on lesser included offenses when requested" ... clashes 
with two fundamental rules of trial in criminal cases; It has 
the effect of the court weighing the evidence and, in 
effect, limiting the jury to a consideration of only part 
of the evidence (the defendant's); and it, in effect, casts 
-13-
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upon the accused the burden of proving his innocence 
or justification." (65 P. 2d at 1132). 
When the accused requests a lesser included instruction 
there should exist a presumption that the requested 
instruction be given. 1 Such is the tenor of this court's 
discussions in the past. In State v. Hvams, 64 U.285, 
230 P.2d 349 (1924), it was stated: 
It is, however, always a delicate 
matter for a trial court to withhold 
from the jury the right to find the 
accused guilty of a lesser or included 
offense, and determine the question 
of the state of the evidence as 
matter of law. That should be done 
onlJ in very clear cases. (64 U.2 at 
287 Accord: State v. Barkas, 
91 U. 574, 580, 65 P.2d 1130 (1937). 
[Emphasis Supplied] 
In recent years this court has endeavored to set 
specific guidelines providing for the submission of lesser 
1. This seems to be the feeling of the court in State v. 
Gillian, supra, 23 U.2d at 376 wherein it is said: 
The usual rule on an appeal 
in which the challenge is to the 
sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the verdict, is that we 
review the record in the light 
favorable to the jury's verdict. 
However, in this situation where 
the question raised relates to the 
r2fusal to submit included offenses, 
it is our duty to survey the whole 
evidence and the inferences naturally 
to be deduced therefrom to see 
whether there is any reasonable 
basis therein which would support 
a conviction of the lesser 
offenses. 
-14-
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included offenses when requested. 
The question that arises then when lesser included 
instructions are requested is: was there" ... any 
evidence, however slight, on any reasonable theory 
under which the defendant might be convicted of the lesser 
[and] included offense . . " of Depriving an Owner. 
State v. Doughtery, supra, at 177; State v. Bell, Utah, 
563 P.2d 186, 188 (1977) (Justice Wilkins,concurring). 
If there was such evidence, then the instructions were 
properly requested and should have been submitted to 
the jury for consideration. 
In the instant case the appellants conceded their 
presence in the vehicle. The thrust of the defense 
centered torally upon the element of his intent or mens 
rea in keeping the vehicle permanently as is required by 
Section 76-6-404, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). 
The appellant TUCKER, at trial, offered testimony which 
indicated that he did not intend to keep the vehicle. 
(R. 346) Under Utah law, this defense would, if believed, 
negate the specific mens rea of "intent to permanently 
deprive the owner of the vehicle" required for a conviction 
under the Theft statute. 
To be convicted of Theft under §76-6-404, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953 as amended), there must be a "purpose 
to deprive" of the owner of the property. "Purpose to 
deprive" is defined in §76-6-401(3) Utah Code Annotated 
(1953 as amended) as follows: 
-15-
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(3) "Purpose to deprive" 
means to have the conscious object: 
(a) To withhold property 
permanently or for so extended a period 
or to use under such circumstances 
that a substantial portion of its 
economic value, or the use and benefit 
thereof, would be lost; or 
(b) To restore the property 
only upon payment of a reward or other 
compensation; or 
(c) To dispose of the property 
under circumstances that make it unlikely 
that the owner will recover it. [Emphasis Supplied] 
At trial, there was no allegation of any of the above 
subsections of the Utah Code. The testimony at trial 
refuted any purpose to "permanently" deprive. Not only 
did Appellant TUCKER testify to the temporary nature of 
the deprivation of the vehicle, but both Darlene and 
~arsha Ruark, the owner of the vehicle and her daughter, 
testitifed that there was no substantial diminishment in 
value to the vehicle. (R. 70-84) For example, the paint 
on the vehicle had not been altered (R. 75. 85), the 
license plates were not removed (R. 74, 85), and the 
evidence indicated no alteration to the vehicle in any 
manner. 
The trier of fact could have concluded that with this 
specific intent to permanently deprive the owner of the 
vehicle lacking, that appellant was guilty of depriving 
an owner of his vehicle under §41-1-109 Utah Code Annotated, 
(1953 as amended). as Class B Misdemeanor. 
This court has ruled in the past that when the defense 
theory propounded at trial is that the defendant lacks 
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the appropriate mens rea and hence should be convicted 
of a lesser included offense, if anything, then it is 
reversible error to refuse to instruct on the lesser 
included offense. State v. Cornish, Utah, 586 P.2d 360 
(1977). 
In Cornish, the issue was whether the accused had 
the specific intent to derpive an owner permanently of 
a vehicle thus constituting the offense of Theft of an 
Operable Motor Vehicle under Utah Code Annotated §76-6-401(3) 
(1953 as amended) , or whether the defendant intended 
to temporarily deprive th~ owner of his vehicle thus 
constituting the offense of Depriving an Owner of a 
Vehicle as in the instant case. In Cornish, the defendant 
testified and said his intent was to only temporarily 
deprive the owner of the vehicle, exactly as the appellant 
TUCKER testified in the instant case. This court ruled 
that the burden is clearly upon the State to prove the 
mens rea element (568 P.2d at 362), and " ... If there 
is an issue of whether the prosecution has sustained this 
burden, or if the defendant presents evidence under his 
theory which negates the factors §76-6-401(3) (intent to 
permanently deprive], - the matter of circumstances of 
intent to deprive should be submitted to the trier of 
fact." (568 P. 2d at 362) 
The issue in the instant case is identical to that 
in Cornish. And since the issue was properly raised by 
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some evidence it should have been submitted to the 
trier of fact for consideration of the lesser included 
offense. The defense evidence was that appellant's 
conduct only amounted to depriving an owner, and the 
jury should have had their rightful opportunity to consider 
that evidence. 
The failure of the trial court to instruct on the 
Appellant's theory was prejudicial error mandating 
reversal of their conviction as to Count I. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL AS TO COUNT 
ONE, THEFT OF AN OPERABLE MOTOR 
VEHICLE HAS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN 
ONLY A CONVICTION FOR DEPRIVING AN 
OHNER OF A VEHICLE TEMPORARILY 
UNDER §41-1-109, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953 as amended). 
Appellants, at the end of all the evidence made a motion 
for a Directed Verdict of Not Guilty on Count One of the 
Information. (R. 406) As argued in Point I without 
reiteration herein, the State failed to show under 
§76-6-401(3) Utah Code Annotated, (1953 as amended), any 
purpose of Appellants to permanently deprive the owner 
of the vehicle. The evidence clearly indicated only a 
temporary deprivation under §41-1-109 Utah Code Annotated, 
(1953 as amended). This statute has been determined to 
be a lesser and included offense of Theft of an Operable 
Motor Vehicle, as charged in Count I of the Information 
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in the instant case. State v. Cornish, Utah 568 P.2d 
3601 (1977); State v. Lloyd, Utah 568 P.2d 357 (1977). 
There was no evidence before the trier of fact 
to show an intent to permanently deprive as required 
by the Theft statute. 2 There is no substantial 
evidence to support the verdict of the jury on Count I, 
State v. Romero, Utah, 554 P.2d 216 (1976), and the 
case should be remanded to the District Court with 
directions to enter a conviction and judgment for the 
misdemeanor offense of Depriving an Owner under §41-1-109 
Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants respectfully submit that there was no 
substantial evidence upon which the trier of fact could 
make a finding of guilt on Count I of the Information, 
Theft of an Operable Motor Vehicle. At best, the facts 
evidence an intent to "temporarily" deprive the owner of 
the vehicle under §41-1-109 Utah Code Annotated (1953 as 
amended) , and a conviction and judgment on remand should 
be entered accordingly. 
Alternatively, Appellants submit that the trial court's 
failure to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense 
of Depriving an Owner of his Vehicle, as requested in 
2. See argument in Point I of this brief. 
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proposed Instructions Two and Three, was reversible 
error and requires reversal of the verdict of the jury 
and judgment entered thereon as to Count One, and the 
instant case should be remanded to the District Court 
for a new trial on that count. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RONALD J. YENGICH 
~neyforAp~ BRAD~ 
Attorney for Appellant SHARP./-
,// I/ . 
'15..1/i~~ ?J'LL f..;;;/,~ t:/-r;0C 
KEVIN KURUMADA 
Attorney for Appellant CHRISTENSEN 
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